I. INTRODUCTION
What does a battle over contested election of judges look like? In Tennessee, it has taken the form of a battle over summary judgment. Since 1971, Tennessee has chosen its appellate judges through merit selection. 1 Pursuant to the -Tennessee Plan,‖ vacancies on the appellate bench are filled by a process of application by interested lawyers, nomination of three candidates by the Judicial Nominating Commission, appointment by the governor, evaluation by the Judicial Evaluation Commission, and retention by the voters every eight years thereafter. 2 In these retention elections, voters vote -yes‖ or -no‖ on the question: -Shall both Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam, also a Republican, and House Speaker Beth Harwell. 12 However, Republican legislators broke with their leadership to pass a resolution in support of a constitutional amendment combining the federal advise-andconsent model for nominating judges with the current system of judicial retention elections. 13 Supporters of the current system have expressed concern that the constitutional amendment route is simply -a back door way to bring on popular election of judges.‖ 14 But the battle over contested election for appellate judges cannot be evaluated in a vacuum. In Tennessee, the issue of contested elections is part of a much larger issue: legislative power over the judiciary. Ironically, when Tennessee entered the union in 1796, its constitution called for complete legislative control over the judiciary, including election of all judges -by joint ballot of the two houses of the General Assembly.‖ 15 Legislative power over the judiciary gradually eroded 16 until, in 1978, the General Assembly passed a comprehensive reform package which reorganized the Tennessee trial courts and granted the supreme court greater rulemaking power. 17 But with the advent of the Republicancontrolled General Assembly, challenges have been raised to the supreme court's power to appoint the Attorney General 18 and to the operation of the Court of the Judiciary, the disciplinary body that oversees all Tennessee judges, a majority of whose members are appointed by the Tennessee Supreme Court. 19 This makes 12 Tom Humphrey, Haslam, Harwell, Ramsey Unite Behind Judge Selection Plan, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Jan. 25, 2012, http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/jan/25/ haslam-harwell-ramsey-unite-behind-judge-plan/. For the constitutional amendment to be successful, it would have to garner the support of two-thirds of both houses of the Tennessee General Assembly in both 2012 and 2013 and a support of the majority of Tennesseans voting in the next gubernatorial election, in 2014. See TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 13 See S.J. Res. 0710, 107th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012). 14 Humphrey, supra note 12 (quoting House Democratic Caucus Chairman Mike Turner (D-Old Hickory)); see also Frank Cagle, Appointing State Appellate Justices Unconstitutional, METROPULSE (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.metropulse.com/news/2012/feb/01/appointing-stateappellate-justices-unconstitution/. 15 See generally White & Reddick, supra note 1, at 503-04 (discussing legislative power over the courts). 16 Legislative election of judges continued until adoption of an amendment to the Constitution in 1853. Id. at 505-06; see also infra Part III. 17 See White & Reddick, supra note 1, at 519. Legislative power over the nominating process continues, however, as the speakers of both houses of the General Assembly are empowered to appoint all seventeen members of the Judicial Nominating Commission. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 483. 18 Tennessee is unique in that its Constitution requires the Supreme Court to appoint the Attorney General. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5. 19 Tennessee one among many states in which the legislature has openly challenged the power of the judiciary. 20 An additional line of attack has been opened on individual rulings of the supreme court. In the 2011 session of the General Assembly, the majority succeeded in passing legislation overruling two recent decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court that were seen as excessively pro-plaintiff and thus unfriendly to business interests. 21 In the first of those decisions, Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 22 the supreme court interpreted Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and rejected the federal Celotex standard for summary judgment, 23 instead requiring that the movant for summary judgment either -negate an essential element of the [nonmovant's] claim‖ or -show that the [nonmovant] cannot prove an essential element of [its case] at trial‖ in order to prevail on its summary judgment motion. 24 In the second decision, Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., the court rejected the federal McDonnell-Douglas framework for evaluating summary judgment motions in retaliatory discharge cases, holding instead that the Hannan summary judgment standard should be applied to those cases. 25 These two legislative attacks on specific supreme court rulings could be viewed simply as isolated victories by special interests, or as discrete instances of legislative dissatisfaction with specific rulings of the court. Indeed, by flexing its legislative muscle, the General Assembly might simply be showing its disregard for the judicial branch; the legislature might be saying that it is the ultimate arbiter of the law of Tennessee. But this relatively benign interpretation of the legislature's action overlooks the larger context. The General Assembly's attempt to control the summary judgment standard constitutes a broadside attack on the supreme http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/aug/28/tennessee-leaders-struggle-over-who-judges-the/ (discussing the individuals -in charge of [judicial] . 22 Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 1. 23 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) . 24 Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 9. 25 Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 777.
court's ability to interpret its own rules. And, by holding contested elections-the proverbial -sword of Damocles‖-over the head of the supreme court, the legislature dared the court to reinstate the Hannan standard by holding the legislation unconstitutional. Thus, whatever power the General Assembly believes it has to control the interpretation of the rules of civil procedure is augmented by its threat to subject the justices of the supreme court and intermediate appellate court judges to contested elections. In the remainder of this article, we will explore the role of summary judgment in the current showdown between the Tennessee Supreme Court and the General Assembly. In Part II, we will briefly discuss Public Chapter No. 498. In Part III, we will explore the constitutionality of the Act repealing Hannan. In Part IV, we will examine whether the Act exceeds the General Assembly's statutory rulemaking powers. And in Part V, we will conclude by restating the larger context, including the political realities, of the inter-branch battle.
II. PUBLIC CHAPTER NO. 498
On the last day of the 2011 regular legislative session, May 20, the Tennessee General Assembly passed Public Chapter No. 498, which purported to overrule Hannan by adopting the Celotex standard for summary judgment. 26 The operative section of the Act creates a new section of the Tennessee Code Annotated, section 20-16-101, which reads as follows:
In motions for summary judgment in any civil action in Tennessee, the moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial shall prevail on its motion for summary judgment if it:
(1) Submits affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim; or (2) Demonstrates to the court that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. 27 The enacted bill contained findings that expressed the legislature's purpose to overrule Hannan on the basis of its conflict with federal law and the finding, unsupported by any evidence in 32 -the constitutional challenge that is sure to come will shed light on the current status of inter-branch power on the state level. 33 A second question arising from enactment of the new law is whether the legislature can depart from its own established processes for amending court rules of practice and procedure. 34 In Tennessee, as in the federal system, the constitution establishes only the supreme court, reserving to the legislature the power to establish inferior courts. 35 33 However, the legislature could be viewed as engaging in an inter-branch game of -chicken‖ by using the specter of popular election of Tennessee's appellate court judges, including the justices of the supreme court, as a deterrent to the court's robust review of the act. 34 42 Yet, despite this explicit delegation of rulemaking power to the Tennessee Supreme Court by the Tennessee legislature, the Tennessee Supreme Court has referred repeatedly to its -inherent power‖ to promulgate rules of practice and procedure. 43 Never before has the General Assembly attempted to amend a rule of civil procedure (or, alternatively, to legislatively overrule the Tennessee Supreme Court's interpretation of a rule of civil procedure); thus, there is no case that answers the question of whether the 37 TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-401 (2009). 38 Id. § 16-3-402. 39 Id. § 16-3-403. 40 legislature can change a rule of civil procedure without following its own processes for doing so.
The history of the summary judgment standards in Tennessee prior to Public Chapter No. 498 can provide useful background to the present examination. An in-depth treatment of those issues and a discussion of the legislative history of the enactment itself can be found elsewhere. 44 
III. IS THE ACT CONSTITUTIONAL?
The legislative caption to Public Chapter Number 498 indicates that its purpose was to overrule the Tennessee Supreme Court's interpretation of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 in Hannan. 45 The language now codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-16-101 goes beyond that stated purpose and appears to overrule the language of Rule 56 itself. 46 Even if, however, the legislation only overrules Hannan, it is open to a constitutional challenge on separation of powers grounds. A review of the history of relevant provisions of the Tennessee Constitution, as well as like provisions in other jurisdictions, suggests that such a challenge may have merit.
A. Separation of Powers Under the Tennessee Constitution
Unlike the United States Constitution, the Tennessee Constitution contains an explicit separation of powers clause. 47 Article II, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that -[t]he powers of the Government shall be divided into three distinct departments: the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial‖ 48 while article II, section 2 states that -[n]o person or persons belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others,‖ except as otherwise permitted in the constitution. 49 This language was not present in the original 44 . that a court created by the Legislature and subject to abolition in the same manner, was not an independent body, and certainly not co-ordinate with the lawmaking power‖). 52 LASKA, supra note 51, at 4; see also White & Reddick, supra note 1, at 504 (observing that, under the 1796 Constitution, -courts only existed if, and when, and as long as the legislature desired‖ and that -the legislature maintained the power to abolish the supreme court since it was not created by the constitution‖). 53 In Cooper, for example, Judge Jacob Peck expounded upon separation of powers principles as follows:
The framers of the constitution never dreamed of admitting the exercise of arbitrary power in any department of the government. The legislative, the executive and the judicial departments are three lines of equal length, balanced against each other, and the framework, forming an equilateral triangle, becomes stronger the more its parts are pressed. Like the foundation of our religion, the trinity, it is the key on which the whole arch rests. The people have erected it; they have seen its suitability for duration, and compared its proportions with the external view of the pyramid, whose age is untold, and which alone, of all the works of man, has withstood the ravages of time. Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States Supreme Court for the proposition that -the difference between the departments, undoubtedly is, that the legislator makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law.‖ 60 Broadly, this means that -[t]he legislative branch has the authority to make, alter, and repeal the law; the executive branch administers and enforces the law; and the judicial branch has the authority to interpret and apply the law.‖ 61 The courts also enjoy certain inherent powers necessary to carry out their judicial function, including, but not necessarily limited to, the power to enforce their judgments 62 and to promulgate rules governing their own practice and procedure. 63 As discussed below, 64 this power to develop and enact rules of procedure governing the courts has been recognized by the General Assembly. 65 The power of the courts to promulgate necessary procedural rules however, -exists by virtue of the establishment of a court and not by largess of the legislature.‖ 66 In other words, the rulemaking power recognized by the legislature does not necessarily define the scope of that power, which derives from a state constitution -which, by necessity, grants all powers necessary to engage in the complete performance of the judicial function.‖ 67 Relying upon their inherent powers, and looking to Chief Justice Marshall's seminal opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 68 Tennessee courts have used the power of judicial review to strike down laws that unconstitutionally infringe upon the powers of the judiciary. 69 he separation of powers doctrine, properly understood, imposes on the judicial branch not merely a [n]egative duty not to interfere with the executive or legislative branches, but a positive responsibility to perform its own job efficiently. This positive aspect of separation of powers imposes on courts affirmative obligations to assert and fully exercise their powers, to operate efficiently by modern standards, to protect their independent status, and to fend off legislative or executive attempts to encroach upon judicial prerogatives.‖). 72 In an opinion written at the turn of the twentieth century, the state supreme court wrote:
In the division of the powers of the three separate and co-ordinate branches of the government certain powers are confided to each, and the judiciary has no more right or warrant to invade and usurp the powers vested in either of the other branches of the government than have the other branches the right to invade and usurp the powers confided to the judicial department of the government; and to do so would be to violate that provision of the constitution so earnestly relied upon by the defendant,-that the three departments of the government are separate and distinct. And, on the other hand, if the court should permit itself to be influenced in the slightest degree by what had been said or done in political conventions, or what had been said and done in obedience to public opinion, in its investigation of and construction of the constitution, it would tend to destroy its own independence, which, in its own sphere, is as absolute and as much protected and guarded in the constitution as is that of the other departments in their respective spheres. It is only by remembering the limits of the power confided to the judicial department of the government and respecting the independence of the other departments, that the judiciary can maintain its own independence in the proper sense of the term . observed that -the Constitution of Tennessee does not prohibit the three branches of government from cooperating with each other,‖ and that, in fact, -[t]he public welfare demands cooperation between the legislative and judicial branches of our government, and an avoidance of unnecessary controversies between them.‖ 74 Given these restrictions on the use of judicial review, it is instructive to briefly survey the cases in the modern era in which Tennessee courts have exercised the power to preserve their ability to enact rules of practice and procedure, as well as circumstances in which the courts have deferred to the legislature.
Cases Asserting Power in the Judicial Branch
One area in which the separation of powers issue has arisen is in the regulation of attorneys.
In Belmont v. Board of Law Examiners, 75 the petitioner, who had previously failed the Tennessee bar examination four times, was denied the opportunity to sit for the exam a fifth time by the Board of Law Examiners, an administrative arm of the Tennessee Supreme Court, pursuant to a supreme court Rule. 76 His petition for writ of certiorari to the Tennessee Supreme Court argued that the court's rule was rendered null and void by a statute that prohibited any state licensing agency from enforcing a rule or regulation limiting the number of times that an otherwise qualified person could sit for a licensing examination. 77 The court held that the statute could apply to boards, commissions, and agencies that are supervised by the legislature, but that an amendment to the statute that specifically applied it to the Board of Law Examiners, 78 an agency of the judicial branch, was unconstitutional. 79 The court relied heavily upon a then-recent decision by the Tennessee Court of Appeals, 80 in which the intermediate appellate court had written that the -supreme judicial and judicial supervisory power is an inherent power of the supreme court and has been so recognized by the legislative branch of our government,‖ 81 and that -‗[i]f the matter of admission of an attorney to the bar is an exercise of a judicial power, that power lies with the supreme court and constitutionally cannot be interfered with by the legislative department of the tripartite government of this State.'‖ 82 Having held the application of the statute to the Board of Law Examiners unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds, the court dismissed the petition. 83 After Belmont, the supreme court addressed whether the Tennessee Board of Dentistry, an administrative board responsible for licensing, regulating, and disciplining Tennessee's practitioners of dentistry, had the power to consider the constitutionality of a statute assessing civil penalties. 84 Citing cases from other jurisdictions, the court observed that it is -widely recognized‖ that -[a]n agency is not authorized to consider or question the constitutionality of a legislative act; nor may it declare unconstitutional the statutes which it was created to administer or enforce.‖ 85 The basis for this general rule in Tennessee is the separation of powers provisions in the state constitution and the fact that, since Marbury v. Madison, -it has been the sole obligation of the judiciary to interpret the law and determine the 78 88 The court held that, to the extent the provision required a petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a statute on its face, the provision violated separation of powers principles. 89 The court's most emphatic statement regarding the separation of powers in recent years is its 2001 decision in State v. Mallard. 90 In Mallard, the court considered a statute that set forth several enumerated factors for courts to consider, -in addition to all other logically relevant factors,‖ when -determining whether a particular object is drug paraphernalia as defined by [Tennessee Code Annotated section] 39-17-402.‖ 91 One of the factors to consider was -[p]rior convictions, if any, of the owner or of anyone in control of the object for violation of any state or federal law relating to controlled substances . . . .‖ 92 The lower courts had held that by requiring courts to consider prior convictions as evidence, the statute directly conflicted with Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), which stated that -[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity with the character trait‖ except in certain circumstances. 93 Justice William M. (-Mickey‖) Barker, writing for a unanimous court, engaged in an extended discussion of the separation of powers clause and the power granted to the judiciary by the Tennessee Constitution. 94 The court observed that, while it may consent to the legislature's decide controversies is impaired if it must depend on, or is limited by, another branch of government in determining and evaluating the facts of the controversies it must adjudicate.‖ Consequently, any legislative enactment that purports to remove the discretion of a trial judge in making determinations of logical or legal relevancy impairs the independent operation of the judicial branch of government, and no such measure can be permitted to stand. 100 Despite this strong language, the court did not strike down Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-424 as an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers. 101 Instead, mindful of its duty to construe legislative enactments as constitutional if at all possible, the court concluded that, despite the clear statement in the statute that courts -shall consider‖ certain factors, the statute only suggested, rather than required, trial courts to consider the factors and thus it supplemented, rather than impaired, the Rules of Evidence. 102 Mallard is not remembered, however, for this strained construction of a statute helping define the term -drug paraphernalia,‖ but rather for the court's expansive view of the judicial powers that preceded it.
The quoted paragraph from Mallard represented a clear extension of the court's definition of the judicial powers beyond previous cases, at least in the modern era. It is notable that, until reaching this point in the opinion, the court had relied primarily upon Tennessee case law. 103 In this paragraph, however, the court chose to cite primarily persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, including Nebraska, 104 Specifically, the court of appeals had stated in Anderson County Quarterly Court that -[i]nherent powers consist of all powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective,‖ and that the inherent powers doctrine has been used primarily, but not exclusively, to secure -relatively minor fiscal expenditures necessary for the courts to operate.‖ 109 It is a significant step from this definition of -inherent powers‖ to the much broader description of those powers in Mallard: -the powers to hear facts, to decide the issues of fact made by the pleadings, and to decide the questions of law involved,‖ and -[a]s an essential corollary to these principles, any determination of what evidence is relevant, either logically or legally, to a fact at issue in litigation . . . .‖ 110 It is not surprising, therefore, that Professor Don Paine 111 wrote in the weeks following Mallard that the opinion -may contain the most significant procedural development I have witnessed since licensure almost 40 years ago. This precedent will be cited for years to come in constitutional attacks on statutes.‖ 112
Cases Deferring to the Legislative Branch
Although the court has, on occasion, taken a broad view of its own powers, it has also, when appropriate, deferred to the legislature to create policy in the area of judicial practice and procedure. In Underwood v. State, 113 for example, a defendant found not guilty of 109 Id. at 879 (citations omitted). The specific examples given by the court of appeals of circumstances in which courts have exercised their inherent powers included fixing the amount of salaries or the time at which a salary increase would take place, hiring employees, and controlling courthouse space. In the years since Mallard, the separation of powers issue has arisen most often in the context of workers' compensation law, an area highly regulated by statute but over which the courts also have significant authority. 131 In Martin v. Lear Corp., 132 the issue was whether a workers' compensation claimant could introduce the testimony of a physician who had examined him at the employer's request. 133 The resolution of this issue required the court to consider the interaction of a workers' compensation provision 134 and a rule of civil procedure. 135 The employer, citing the procedural rule 127 King, 973 S.W.2d at 587. 128 Id. at 589. 129 Id. 130 Id. . 133 Id. at 628. 134 Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-204 (f) (1999) (-Any physician whose services are furnished or paid for by the employer and who treats or makes or is present at any examination of an injured employee may be required to testify as to any knowledge acquired by such physician in the course of such treatment or examination as same relates to the injury or disability arising therefrom.‖)). 135 Id. (quoting TENN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(4)(B) (-A party may not discover the identity of, facts known by, or opinions held by an expert who has been consulted by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not to be called as a witness at trial except as provided in Rule 35.02 or upon a showing that the party seeking discovery that protects from discovery the opinion of a consulting expert who will not be called as a witness, claimed that the workers' compensation statute suggesting otherwise violated separation of powers principles. 136 The court held that it did not for two reasons: first, because the statute did not impermissibly conflict with Rule 26.02, but merely limited its application in certain circumstances; and second, because the General Assembly -is the appropriate body to set the policy that governs workers' compensation cases,‖ and the statute is consistent with the remedial nature of the workers' compensation system. 137 Four years after Martin, the court in Lynch v. City of Jellico 138 addressed whether the administrative benefit review process established by statute violated Article II, section 2 of the Tennessee Constitution. 139 Amendments to the Tennessee workers' compensation statute in 2004 established that, prior to filing suit against their employer, workers' compensation claimants must first submit to an administrative benefit review process through the state Department of Labor and Workforce Development. 140 Only after the benefit review conference proves fruitless may the employee or employer file a complaint related to the claim in the Circuit or Chancery Court. 141 In Lynch, the court reversed the holding of the trial court that this process was unconstitutional. 142 As to the separation of powers argument, the court stated that -the benefit review conference does not substitute for a workers' compensation action‖ and that -[t]he courts will ultimately adjudicate a worker's claim if the case is not settled at the benefit review conference.‖ 143 Therefore, the court held that -the benefit review process does not frustrate the adjudicative function of the judicial branch.‖ 144 Thus, despite the court's strong language in Mallard, it has consistently given leeway to the legislature to create procedures consistent with the statutory purpose, at least in the cannot obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.‖)). 136 area of workers' compensation law. 145 A recent per curiam opinion by the court 146 provides insight into what might be a nascent conflict between the legislative and judicial branches in Tennessee over workers' compensation law. Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(5) allows for either party in a workers' compensation dispute to -request an independent medical examiner from the commissioner's registry‖ if there is a dispute as to the degree of the employee's medical impairment. 147 Under the statute, this independent medical examiner's written impairment rating -shall be presumed to be the accurate impairment rating; provided, however, that this presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.‖ 148 In Mansell, the trial court had granted the employee's motion to quash the employer's request for an independent medical impairment rating, holding that the statute applies only during the administrative review process and not after a court acquires jurisdiction. 149 The court indicated that to hold otherwise and prevent the court from choosing the impairment rating would -usurp[] [a] judicial power that is basically vested in [the court] once the law suit is filed.‖ 150 On appeal, both the employer and the Attorney General, as amicus curiae, argued that the process -does not interfere with the adjudicative function‖ because the presumption of correctness granted to the rating by the statute may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 151 The supreme court remanded to the trial court to allow the parties and the Attorney General to more fully develop the record. 152 The court indicated, however, that it was interested in addressing the constitutional issue by ordering that the hearing on remand occur within ninety days and that any appeal of the trial court's judgment be placed directly on the court's docket rather than being referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel. 153 145 An exception to this came in 2003 when the court, citing its inherent power to promulgate rules governing practice and procedure, held that the thirty-day period for filing a notice of appeal in civil actions set forth in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 controls whether or not a statistical data form is filed contemporaneously with the judgment, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-244(b 
B. Source of Judicial Power over Rulemaking in Other Jurisdictions
While a separate and independent judiciary is an essential component of the federal government and every state government, the particular interplay among the branches differs from state to state. The power of the judicial branch vis-à-vis the legislature obviously manifests itself in the rulemaking process established in each state. 154 It is also helpful, however, to briefly survey other jurisdictions for their view on the separation of powers provisions of their constitutions and specifically, the ability of the legislatures in those states to enact procedural rules.
In some states, the constitution expressly grants the power to make rules of practice and procedure to the judiciary. The Arizona Constitution, for example, grants to the Arizona Supreme Court the -[p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court.‖ 155 Because of this constitutional power, -if the legislature intrudes into the procedural realm, a question implicating the separation of powers doctrine is raised.‖ 156 Despite this broad grant of power, the judiciary in Arizona will still conclude that the legislature's action is permissible if it -‗seem[s] reasonable and workable'‖ and supplements, rather than contradicts, the existing rules made by the court. 157 However, the court draws the line -when a conflict arises, or a statutory rule tends to engulf a general rule of admissibility,‖ such as when the legislature attempts to repeal a rule of evidence or civil procedure. 158 In other words, the Arizona legislature and supreme court -both have rulemaking power, but . . . in the event of irreconcilable conflict between a procedural statute and a rule, the rule prevails.‖ 159 Specifically, -the legislature cannot enact a statute that ‗provides an analytical framework contrary to the [procedural] rules.'‖ 160 Other states with like constitutional provisions have used similar language to reaffirm the power of the judiciary over procedural rulemaking. 161 In at least one state with such constitutional language, Florida, the legislature has attempted to limit the state supreme court's power to establish rules of practice and procedure through constitutional amendment. 162 In other states, the constitution does not expressly grant the power of procedural rulemaking to the courts, but the judiciary has held that ability is a necessary corollary to the power that has been granted to them by the people through the constitution. The Kentucky Constitution, for example, simply states that the judicial power shall be vested in the state supreme court and lower courts and that -[t]he court shall constitute a unified judicial system for operation and administration.‖ 163 Courts there have held that this grant of the judicial power to the courts carries with it, as a necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the administration of justice under the Constitution. Rules of practice and procedure are, fundamentally, matters within the judicial power and subject to the control of the courts in the administration of justice. 164 Thus, the circumstance in Kentucky is comparable to that in Tennessee: there is no express grant of power over practice and procedure in the state constitution, but the judiciary has held that CONST. art. 6, § 3, which gives the state supreme court -authority to promulgate rules of procedure, including appellate procedure, to be followed by all the courts of this state‖). The constitutions of at least two states, Alaska and Missouri, grant the state supreme court the power to create procedural rules for -all courts and administrative tribunals,‖ but reserves some limited -veto power‖ to the legislature. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15 (-The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts [and] governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases in all courts. These rules may be changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house.‖); MO. CONST. art. 5, § 5 (stating that any procedural rule -may be annulled or amended in whole or in part by a law limited to the purpose‖). 162 Gibeaut, supra note 20, at 44. The Florida Constitution states that -[t]he supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts‖ and that -rules [of court] may be repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature.‖ FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a). In 2011, the Florida legislature placed a measure on the November 2012 ballot that -would lower the threshold needed to repeal a rule of procedure to a 50 percent vote from the two-thirds majority now required.‖ Gibeaut, supra note 20, at 49; see also Initiatives/Amendments/Revisions, FLA. DIV. OF such power is necessary to the exercise of the inherent power that does inure to the judiciary. 165 Even in states where the judiciary's power to enact rules of practice and procedure is granted by statute, 166 and not expressly or implicitly by the state constitution, the courts may vigorously stress their power to regulate their own procedural rules. For example, the Indiana Supreme Court has stated -that the procedural rules of the judiciary, as promulgated from time to time by this Court, are independent of legislative sanction.‖ 167 On the one hand, this stands for the proposition that if the court has -failed to speak‖ in a particular area, then judicial procedure may be provided by legislative enactment until such time as the court -elect[s] to alter [it] or abrogate it by rule.‖ 168 On the other hand, -[i]t is a fundamental rule of law in Indiana that ‗in the event of a conflict between a procedural statute and a procedural rule adopted by the supreme court, the latter shall take precedence.'‖ 169 The judicial branches in other states also appear to have had the rulemaking power expressly granted by statute, but those statutes arguably recognize, rather than confer, the power. 170 Tennessee, of course, also has a statutory rulemaking procedure, but it is debatable whether the court's authority to promulgate procedural rules derives from its inherent powers or the legislative enactment. 171 
C. Application to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-16-101
Do the decisions of the Tennessee courts and persuasive authority from other jurisdictions provide any hint as to how the Tennessee courts will respond to the new summary judgment legislation? Perhaps, although examples of a state legislature's overruling of either a rule of civil procedure or a judicial interpretation of such a rule are exceedingly rare. 172 However, two major lessons can be gleaned from the separation of powers cases in Tennessee and elsewhere.
On the one hand, the Tennessee courts have given the General Assembly quite a bit of leeway to regulate procedure where the legislature has established a statutory scheme, such as in workers' compensation and some criminal cases. Even in spheres where the courts are highly protective of their power, such as with their regulation of attorneys, they have been willing to allow the legislature to limit that power in order to protect the public. 173 It is true that the legislature in Tennessee has, indeed, established a statutory scheme with regard to procedural rulemaking. 174 However, the summary judgment legislation clearly exceeds that power because it engages in the development of procedural rules outside the process set forth by both custom and statute. 175 Thus, the Tennessee courts are unlikely to view this as a circumstance in which they would typically defer to the legislature to establish procedural rules and standards. 176 On the other hand, courts are unlikely to sanction the exercise of judicial review, or any of their other inherent judicial powers, by the other two branches of government. 177 And the definition of -inherent powers‖ in Tennessee appears, after Mallard, to include any activities essential to perform the judicial function, including procedural rulemaking. The courts in Tennessee do not have the benefit of an explicit constitutional basis for the conclusion that courts have the complete power over procedural rulemaking. However, there is established precedent for the determination that the ability to create and develop procedural rules is necessary to the exercise of the courts' independent power under the Tennessee Constitution, one which has a long history dating back to the 1835 constitution. 178 The language in Mallard is most instructive. A court's role in determining whether to grant or deny summary judgment is significantly different depending on whether it applies the Celotex or Hannan standards. 179 The essential difference between the two is the amount of evidence required at the summary judgment stage for the moving party to shift the burden of production to the nonmovant and, ultimately, to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact about each and every element of the claim. 180 Although courts do not weigh the evidence at this stage, this determination surely requires a judge -to hear facts . . . and to decide the questions of law involved.‖ 181 The imposition of a new summary judgment standard, then, impairs a -court's constitutional function to independently decide controversies.‖ 182 Thus, the courts could very well hold that the legislation exceeds the legislature's constitutional authority by enacting -rules, either of evidence or otherwise, that strike at the very heart of a court's exercise of judicial power.‖ 183 Further, this is a circumstance where the courts are unlikely to concede power to the legislature -purely out of considerations of inter-branch comity,‖ because that -courtesy does not extend to the surrendering of judicial power.‖ 184
D. The Current Political Climate in Tennessee
The Tennessee Supreme Court's willingness to invalidate the Public Chapter Number 498 may be affected by political realities. On January 11, 2011, for the first time since Reconstruction, the Tennessee General Assembly convened in Nashville with a Republican majority in both houses. 185 The newly inaugurated Governor, Bill Haslam, was likewise a Republican. With this triumvirate of Republican control, the General Assembly was free to continue the business-friendly agenda it had begun under the previous Governor, Democrat Phil Bredesen, and to intensify its ongoing campaign against the perceived excesses of the Tennessee Supreme Court. 186 Republican legislators sponsored employerfriendly changes in the workers' compensation scheme and passed statutes limiting monetary recovery by tort plaintiffs. 187 Most recently, in addition to their attempt to overturn the Hannan summary judgment standard, the legislature has sought greater power over the Court of the Judiciary. Underlying all these efforts is the specter of the contested election of appellate judges, which in recent years has hovered over all encounters between the supreme court and the General Assembly. One legal seminar recently posited that the Tennessee Supreme Court may hesitate to overturn Public Chapter Number 498 because it is fearful of contested judicial elections. 188 In 2004, the General Assembly enacted the Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 2004, a massive overhaul of Tennessee's workers' compensation system. 189 Most notably, the Act required that injured workers first mediate their claims with the Department of Labor before they could avail themselves of the court system. 190 Likewise, the Act severely restricted injured 184 Id. at 482 (quotation omitted). 185 Sher, supra note 9. 186 See id. workers' potential recoveries. 191 During the 2011 session, the General Assembly passed even more employer-friendly workers' compensation legislation, 192 requiring that an injured worker's treating physicians must -communicate‖ with and provide medical records to the patient's employer, even if the employee specifically requests otherwise, and redefining what injuries are compensable through the workers' compensation scheme. 193 Further, on June 16, 2011, Governor Haslam signed into law the Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011. 194 This long-awaited tort reform measure 195 caps noneconomic damages for individual plaintiffs in most civil actions at $750,000, and punitive damages at $500,000. 196 Some members of the legislature have complained that this tort reform did not go far enough to protect business interests in the state, and additional reforms were enacted during the 2012 legislative session. 197 The General Assembly has also turned its attention to the Court of the Judiciary. Established by statute, the court investigates allegations of misconduct by Tennessee judges and imposes discipline. 198 The Court of the Judiciary has sixteen members: ten judges appointed by the Tennessee Supreme Court, three members appointed by the Tennessee Bar Association, and one member each appointed by the Governor, the House speaker, and the Senate speaker pro tempore. 199 As one commentator puts it, -the judicial branch is in control.‖ 200 The Court of the Judiciary was criticized by Republicans for failing to effectively police the judiciary, with critics pointing to the fact that few complaints resulted in discipline, and much of the discipline was issued in the form of private reprimands. 201 In response, a Republican legislator introduced a bill during the 2011 session to shrink membership on the Court of the Judiciary to twelve, all of them appointed by either the House speaker or the Senate pro tempore. 202 Under the Republican proposal, -the Legislature would be in control.‖ 203 Although a compromise proposal was enacted in 2012, the legislature's restructuring of the Court of the Judiciary is an additional example of the tension between the legislative and judicial branches, and represents -a fairly straightforward assault on the independence of the judicial branch.‖ 204 Perhaps the most frightening political reality for the current supreme court is the prospect of contested elections. Although Tennessee's judicial retention elections are non-partisan, the supreme court has historically been a Democratic bastion. 205 The only Tennessee Supreme Court justice who has failed to win retention under Tennessee's merit selection plan, Penny J. White, was defeated by a concerted effort led by the Tennessee Conservative Union, supported by state Republican leaders, who painted her as a liberal extremist who put the rights of criminals before the rights of victims. 206 The admitted goal of at least some of those who promote contested elections is to influence the outcome of judicial decisions. 207 The Lieutenant Governor and Speaker of the Senate, Ron Ramsey, admits that the legislature is skeptical of the current supreme court, noting that he hopes the present system, with a Republican governor in place, will -mov[e] [the court] to the right a little bit.‖ 208 But the reality that contested judicial elections are costly has led to an unlikely coalition between lawyers' groups and business advocates. Regardless of whether Public Chapter Number 498 is unconstitutional as violating the separation of powers clause, the question arises of whether the act is void because it violates the terms of the General Assembly's purported delegation of power to the supreme court. Although the history of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 makes it clear that Congress retains the power to promulgate, or at least amend, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outside the process enacted by the Rules Enabling Act, 211 the situation in Tennessee is not so clear.
To the extent that Tennessee's system for promulgating the rules of practice and procedure depends upon legislative delegation of power in Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-3-403, the federal analogue is persuasive. 212 But Tennessee's system also differs from the federal system, not only because the General Assembly must actively approve of all rules of civil procedure, but also because the legislature has itself declared that the Tennessee Supreme Court's power over procedure is -full, plenary, and discretionary.‖ 213 Thus, the General Assembly has assigned itself a role in the promulgation and amendment of the rules of civil procedure, one which arguably leaves no room for ad hoc rulemaking by the legislature, such as the recent act purporting to overrule Hannan. 214 The delegation issue can be analyzed in terms of three sequential questions: (1) Did the General Assembly have any power to delegate when it purported to delegate rulemaking power to the Tennessee Supreme Court?; (2) If so, did it delegate all of its power, or did it retain residual rulemaking power after the delegation?; and (3) If it did retain any rulemaking power, did the General Assembly limit its own exercise of that power by prescribing a limited role for itself in the rulemaking process?
As to the first question--whether the General Assembly had any 211 any delegation of power by the General Assembly. 221 The case that is most on point with the current state of the law is Mallard. 222 As noted earlier, the Mallard court insisted on its own inherent rulemaking power. 223 However, the court also recognized a limited role for legislative rulemaking:
The authority of the General Assembly to enact rules of evidence in many circumstances is not questioned by this Court. Its power in this regard, however, is not unlimited, and any exercise of that power by the legislature must inevitably yield when it seeks to govern the practice and procedure of the courts. 224 Noting the fuzzy line between substance and procedure, the supreme court elaborated on the respective powers of the General Assembly and the court:
[W]e have frequently acknowledged the broad power of the General Assembly to establish rules of evidence in furtherance of its ability to enact substantive law. But, as the General Assembly can constitutionally exercise only the legislative power of the state, its broad ability to enact rules for use in the courts must necessarily be confined to those areas that are appropriate to the exercise of that power. Although any discussion of the precise contours of this legislative power is not appropriate in this case, it is sufficient to acknowledge that such power exists and that it is necessarily limited by the very nature of the power itself. 225 Thus, although the court's analysis is less than pellucid, the court appears to confine the General Assembly's rulemaking power to its substantive legislative power. 226 In other words, the court seems to deny to the General Assembly any freestanding rulemaking power apart from the enactment of substantive law. 227 If Tennessee's legislature lacks freestanding rulemaking authority, it is less powerful than the United States Congress in this regard. In at least three instances, Congress has passed legislation inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 228 The most notable instance of congressional rulemaking was its treatment of amendments to Rule 4 in 1982, first passing legislation to postpone the amendments proposed by the United States Supreme Court and then drafting and passing its own version of the amendments. 229 In none of these instances does it appear that a challenge was raised to Congress's power to legislate rules. Indeed, some scholars have asserted that the congressional delegation of rulemaking power to the Supreme Court in the Rules Enabling Act is unconstitutional because, in light of the practical inability to separate procedure and substance, it permits the Supreme Court to make substantive law. 230 Assuming that the Tennessee General Assembly had rulemaking power to delegate in Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-3-403, does it retain any rulemaking power post-delegation?
The rulemaking power of Congress may provide a valid analogue to the post-delegation power of Tennessee's General Assembly. Like the General Assembly, Congress has legislatively delegated the power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure to the Supreme Court. 231 And like the Tennessee General Assembly, Congress must approve of proposed rules before they become effective. 232 However, on the eve of the adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the Tennessee legislature, unlike Congress, expressly declared: -This part shall constitute a broad conference of full, plenary and discretionary power upon the supreme court.‖ 233 If -full‖ and -plenary‖ power resides in the supreme court, it would seem that the General Assembly can have no residual rulemaking power.
Nevertheless, in crafting the process by which the Rules of Civil Procedure are promulgated, the General Assembly crafted a role for itself. If Congress's negative veto power over the federal rules indicates that rulemaking power originates in and remains with Congress, 234 then the Tennessee General Assembly's role of giving positive approval to the rules may indicate its ultimate power over rulemaking. Indeed, in Tennessee, if rulemaking power inheres in the supreme court, regardless of the statutory delegation, then it seems illogical that the court submits its rules to the General Assembly for approval. If the Tennessee General Assembly has no power over rulemaking, then its approval of the court's rules would seem to be, at best, superfluous.
Assuming, therefore, that the General Assembly retains some power over rulemaking, what is the scope of that power? One limitation on the General Assembly's power is found in the process it has prescribed for promulgating the rules. The rules are initially drafted by the Tennessee Supreme Court, but become effective only after the General Assembly approves them by joint resolution. 235 Thus, the legislature has delimited its role in the rulemaking process to one of approval only. It has not preserved for itself any role in the process of making rules other than that of approving rules drafted by the supreme court. 236 To the extent it might have had power to engage in naked rulemaking prior to the delegation, it has instead chosen to confine its role to approval of rules presented 236 Recently, the supreme court, recognizing the delineation of authority in the rulemaking process, declined to interpret one of the discovery rules in a way that was inconsistent with legislative history, despite the fact that Tennessee is in the extreme minority of jurisdictions on the issue. Instead, it deferred to the rulemaking process and simply expressed its preference for Tennessee to join other states in following changes in the corresponding federal rule. See Thomas v. Oldfield, 279 S.W.3d 259, 264 (Tenn. 2009). Similarly, in Webb, the supreme court declined to adopt the federal -plausibility‖ pleading standard by judicial decision, instead deferring to the rulemaking process. Webb v. Nashville Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 424, (Tenn. 2011).
to it. This interpretation of the General Assembly's residual power harmonizes with its grant of -full‖ and -plenary‖ power to the supreme court. 237 Within Tennessee's statutory rulemaking scheme, the supreme court wields -full‖ and -plenary‖ power to write the rules; the General Assembly's only power is one of approval or disapproval.
This interpretation, however logical, seems to be challenged by the declaration of the supreme court in If this interpretation of Vaughn's declaration is valid, then presumably the General Assembly can make and amend court rules at will. However, it appears that the statement in Vaughn simply refers to the status of the rules and the necessity for the courts to interpret them just as any other -laws‖ would be interpreted.
As noted, the supreme court in Mallard suggested another boundary. Namely, the General Assembly's power over court rules extends only to matters of substance: -[W]e have frequently acknowledged the broad power of the General Assembly to establish rules of evidence in furtherance of its ability to enact substantive law.‖ 241 Treating the Rules of Civil Procedure as -laws‖ subject to interpretation pursuant to this section, the court held that -the specific provisions in [the uninsured motorist statute] prevail over the conflicting general provisions in T.R.C.P. Rule 3.‖ 247 Several points are noteworthy here. First, the statutory service provisions applied only to one type of action: suit against an uninsured motorist carrier. 248 Second, the court discerned a clear substancerelated purpose for the procedural provision: providing an efficient remedy-more efficient than the cumbersome reissuance requirements of Rule 3-for plaintiffs injured by uninsured motorists. 249 Finally, the court applied the canon of statutory construction that -the specific controls the general‖ to give effect to the substance-related statutory provision. 250 Thus, the Lady court's 242 Lady, 747 S.W.2d at 342. 243 Id. at 343. Specifically, the statute permitted service upon the plaintiff's uninsured motorist carrier without compliance with Rule 3's -requirement that new process be issued every six months or the action be refiled yearly.‖ Id. at 345. 244 Id. at 345. 245 Id. 246 Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-103) (emphasis added). 247 Id. 248 Id. at 344. 249 See id. at 345. 250 Id. resolution of the conflict indicates that the substance-related rulemaking power acknowledged by the Mallard court probably refers to substance-specific procedures. Public Chapter Number 498 does not qualify as the sort of substance-specific rule to which legislative power extends. The Act sets a new standard for granting summary judgment that is transsubstantive-applicable to any civil action, rather than limited to a specific type of action. Because summary judgment involves only the evaluation of claims and evidence, and by definition, involves no evaluation of the substance of a claim, a change in the summary judgment standard could not be classified as substantive. 251 Public Chapter Number 498 fails the Mallard court's definition of valid legislative rulemaking.
No Tennessee court has ever held that a Rule of Civil Procedure could be legislatively overruled. In every case in which a statute and a court rule were alleged to conflict, the Tennessee courts have harmonized the two, sometimes giving effect to the statute and sometimes to the rule. For example, in State ex rel. Leech v. Wright, 252 a suit seeking ouster of the Lincoln County Road Commissioner, the supreme court stated that -if there is any conflict between any express provision of the ouster statutes and the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the ouster statute should prevail.‖ 253 Nevertheless, the court read the ouster statute as governing only amendments to the form of the complaint, holding that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs substantive amendments and reversing the trial court's denial of the motion to amend. 254 In Mid-South Pavers v. Arnco Construction, the Tennessee Court of Appeals harmonized the statute governing revivor of actions with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 25.01 by holding that Rule 25.01 sets forth the first step in the revivor process, while the statute prescribes the second step in the process. 255 the rule and the statute to effectively revive its action. 256 These efforts by the courts to harmonize apparently conflicting statutes and court rules are consistent with the Mallard court's restrained approach to inter-branch comity. Unfortunately, it is doubtful that Public Chapter Number 498 can be saved by resourceful reading. First, the statute purports to establish an entirely novel standard for summary judgment: the statute provides that the movant -shall prevail‖ if it meets the Celotex standard. 257 Read literally, this enactment provides no opportunity for the nonmovant to respond to the movant's showing. The Hannan standard merely prescribes the showing necessary for the movant to shift the burden of production to the nonmovant; it does not permit the movant to -prevail‖ regardless of any showing by the nonmovant. 258 This difficulty might be overcome by resourceful reading, 259 but if the Tennessee Supreme Court is faced with one of the very rare cases in which the second prong of the Hannan test is implicated, 260 there appears to be no way to harmonize the statute and the Hannan standard other than by reinserting the two words -at trial‖ into the second prong.
In summary, then, the General Assembly's attempt to amend Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 in Public Chapter Number 498 probably exceeded its power under the statutory scheme for the promulgation and amendment of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In light of the supreme court's -full, plenary and discretionary power‖ within the statutory scheme, there is no residual power in the legislature to enact rules of practice and procedure for the courts. Because the legislature's only role within 256 Id. Specifically, the court held that Rule 25.01 changed the statutory scheme from a requirement of consent or scire facias to a simple motion and order of substitution of parties. However, the second statutory step-filing the order in duplicate in the probate court-was not addressed by the rule; therefore, that portion of the statute must still be complied with.
Id.
257 Act of May 20, 2011, ch. 498, § 1, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts ___. 258 At least one commentator has glossed over this distinction by asserting that both Byrd and Hannan set the standard by which the movant should prevail, rather than simply articulating the movant's initial burden of production. See Blumstein, supra note 28, at 16 (chart comparing Byrd, Hannan, and Public Chapter Number 498). 259 The court might read the poorly drafted statute to merely reflect the legislature's intention that the movant can -shift the burden of production to the nonmovant‖ by complying with either of the statutory prongs. This charitable reading is arguably no more extreme than the Mallard court's willingness to read the verb -shall‖ as -should.‖ See supra note 102 and accompanying text. this statutory scheme is to approve rules of civil procedure promulgated by the supreme court, it has no power to create rules outside this process. 261 Although, as the Mallard court recognized and the Lady court held, the legislature can validly enact substance-specific rules of procedure, Public Chapter Number 498 is trans-substantive. 262 V. CONCLUSION The current situation in Tennessee is a vivid illustration of how the mere threat of contested judicial elections can affect the legal climate. The legislature's attempt to amend Tennessee's summary judgment rule, or to overrule the Tennessee Supreme Court's interpretation of it, all while circumventing the established rulemaking process, adumbrates much larger issues about the independence of the judicial branch. Legal arguments can be made about the validity of Public Chapter Number 498-it violates the separation of powers clause of the Tennessee Constitution; it trenches upon the inherent powers of the Tennessee Supreme Court; it runs afoul of the statutory process that by definition delimits the Tennessee General Assembly's power to make rules of practice and procedure. But the real battle being fought in Tennessee is not one between Celotex and Hannan-it is, as the Mallard court put it, a battle between -courtesy‖ and -concession.‖ 261 Notably, during the very brief debate over the legislation on the floor of the Tennessee Senate, Sen. Lowe Finney (D-Jackson) implored the sponsor, Sen. Brian Kelsey (RGermantown) to allow the Rules Committee the opportunity to review the bill before passage. Sen. Kelsey responded that the because the bill had been introduced months earlier, the Tennessee Bar Association had the opportunity to take it to the Rules Committee, but had not done so, and at any rate, it was unnecessary for the Rules Committee to review it. Statement of Sen. Kelsey, Senate Floor, May 20, 2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer .php?view_id=186&clip_id=43288. 262 Although one commentator has sought to relate Public Chapter Number 498 to tort reform measures passed during the same legislative session, the legislature itself made no reference to tort reform in the preamble to the bill that was eventually enacted, undermining any argument that the act had a substance-specific purpose. See Blumstein, supra note 28, at 17.
